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Ahitract
In eany studies of coalition foraatlon* the valuo 
of tho grand coalition (tho coalition of all players) la 
aiuch graator than tho valuoa of all saaller eoalitlona. 
Tho oroaant atudy attaapted to oxtond tho generality of 
aaveral theorlea by aaaeaalng their accuracy in a gaaa 
where the grand coalition ia act to zero. Tho affacta 
of lnputa on the accuracy of different thaorioa ware 
exaalned* aa wall aa the affacta of two varlablea 
designed to incraaao tho eoapatltlve aotlvation of tho 
bargainers. Tho results indicate that incraasad 
coapotltiva aotlvation had negligible affacta* but 
several properties of tho inputs had significant affects 
on the accuracy of different theories. Tho results 
suggest aoaa laeortant llaltations on the generality of 
several theoriesi in particular* that eeuity theory is 
severely restricted in generality.
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A coalition aay bo defined es two or aore parties 
who spree to cooporate (pool their resources) in order 
to obtain soae autuolly desired outcoae (Koaorlts end 
Kravltz* 1983). Outeoaes aey be anything that huaen 
beings desire (wealth* status* power* etc.) end the 
resources that ere pooled aay be anything necessary to 
obtain the desired outcoae (skills* abilities* aoney* 
etc.). Exaaples of coalitions include* e group of 
workers bending together to fora e trade union to obtain 
better working conditions* e aajor political party that 
uses the joint resoureos of Individual aeabers to 
Influence governaent policies* or the aerger of 
coapsnles who pool their resources to increase profit.
At tho organisational level* the Influence of coalitions 
was dascrlbad by Cyart and March (1983) who arguad that 
the oparatlva goals of an organisation ariaa froa tha 
characteristics of tho persons In the doalnant 
coalition, lacauso coalition foraation is a pervasive 
aspect of social interaction* it Is iaportant to 
understand coalition processes end the behaviors that 
accaapany thaa.
A review ef theory and research in coalition 
foraation indlcatos that a variety of thoories have been 
proposed (ef. reviews by Kahan and Rapoport* 1988) 
Koaorita and Kravltx* 1983) Nurnlnghaa* 1978). Many of 
those theories are based on two iaportant conceptsi
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power snd equity. The aost relevant conceptualisation 
of power in coalition situations is one proposed by 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959). They hypothesise that a 
person's bargaining power is based on his/her 
"comparison level for alternatives (CLelt)* defined as 
the lowest level of outcoaes a aeaber will accept in 
light of alternative opportunities" (p.21). If outcoaes 
in a relationship are greater than a person's CLalta , 
he/she is likely to stay in that relationship. If, 
however) the outcome of one of the parties is less than 
his/her CLalt * then he/she is aore likely to leave the 
relationship. One Implication in a coalition situation 
is that the aeaber with lower expectations in 
alternative coalitions is likely to concode aore than a 
aeaber who has greater expectations. Thera is 
considerable evidence supporting this conception of 
bargaining power (Thibaut and Facheux* 19*5) Thibaut and 
Truder) 1949) Koaorlta and Kravitz* 1979) Koaorita* 
Lapworthi and Tuaonls* 1981). Furtheraore* there is 
substantial evidence to suggest the* power based on 
CLalta of the bargainers has considerable influence on 
reward distributions in a coalition situation (cf. 
reviews by Hurnlnghaa* 1978) Kahan and ftapoport* 1984).
The concept of equity (Justice) can be aero 
appropriately described as noras regarding a fair or 
reasonable distribution of rewards in a relationship.
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Thors is considerable evidence to support ths 
significant offsets of justice norm on reward 
distribution in a coalition situation (Gaason* 1841) 
Koaorita and Chertkoff* 197S* Rapoport and Kahan* 1883). 
For exaaplo, in Lavanthal and Hichatls' (194?) raward 
allocation paradlga* two subjacts ara askad to perforn a 
joint task and ara glvan faadback on thair perforaance 
on the task. Bssad on thair joint parforaanca thay ara 
awardad a group raward (priza) and ona of thaa is givan 
tha authority to allocata (divide) tha priza. Subjacts 
who ara glvan tha authority to divlda tha priza 
conslstantly allocata a .slzabla shara of aonay to thair 
co-workar (Lavanthal and Lana* 1870) Lavanthal and 
Michaels* 1848). Tha fact that tha allocator could hava 
takan all of tha aonay with no faar of rataliation froa 
thair co-workar tastifias to tha strangth of tha justlca 
aotiva.
Oasplta nuaarous studios supporting tha iaportanco 
of powar and justlca in coalition situations* faw 
attaapts hava baan aada to lntagrata tha two concopts.
It has baan suggastad that any thaory that lgnoras 
aithar powar or Justlca is not llkaly to ba accurata in 
a varlaty of situations (Koaorita* 1884). As a tast of 
this hypothasls* Koaorita and Leung (1885) axtandad tha 
typical coalition paradiga by raauiring subjacts to 
"invest" varying nuabers of points in a thraa-parson
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game .
To illustrate this paradigm* consider the 
three-person game shown in Figure 1* where A* B* and C 
denote the three players* and vC ) denotes the value of 
the coalition in parentheses.
Insert Figure 1 about here
This game is an example of a class of games called a
quota game (Shapley* 1953) in which there is a vector
of weights associated with the players such that for
any pair of players i and j* v(ij) = w ♦ w . These
i i
weights are called the quota values of the players* and 
the value of each coalition is equal to the sum of the 
quota values of the players in that coalition. Quota 
values represent an index of power (bargaining advantage) 
of the players in the game. For the game in Figure 1* 
the quota values of players A* B, and C are 60* 40,
a
and 20* respectively.
In a typical experiment using this paradigm* the 
three players are asked to assume that they are three 
investors who must form a business partnership to 
maximize profit. If no partnership is formed* their 
profit is zero; if a partnership is formed, the profit 
is 150* 100* i30* or 60* as specified in the quota game.
Justice Norms
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To introduce justice norms in this coalition situation* 
the three subjects are told that each must pay a certain 
number of points at the beginning of the game. These 
points represent the overhead costs (investments) of the 
business partners. For example* prior to bargaining* 
players A* B* and C» are required to make investments 
(inputs) of 35* 25* and 15 units* respectively. The 
interesting question is how such "investments” will 
affect the negotiation of profit.
In the game presented here* the value of the ABC 
coalition is much larger than the values of the other 
coalitions. This type of game is said to be 
SUBTiildAlA.yjl > defined as a game in which the value of 
any coalition is at least as large as the sum of the 
quota values of the nonoverlapping subsets of players in 
the coalition. Since the value of the ABC coalition is 
much larger than the values of the other coalitions* it 
is reasonable to assume that the ABC coalition is very 
likely to form. There is considerable evidence 
suggesting that the probability of the ABC coalition 
increases directly with its value* relative to the 
values of the two person coalitions (Komorlta* Hamilton* 
l Kravitz* 198*; Hedlin* 1978).
Also* it can be seen that the values of the 
alternative coalitions of the three players dlfferi 100 
and 80 for player A* 100 and 80 for player B* and 80 and
Justict Norms
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60 for player C. According to tho alternatives of the 
players (CLalt)* player A should get the largest share 
and player C the smallest. There is considerable 
evidence supporting this hypothesis (Komorita* 1984* 
Murningham* 1978) •
Three types of models yield predictions in this 
paradigm! 1) models based exclusively on justice norms* 
2) models based exclusively on power (ignoring the 
inputs of the bargainers)* and 3) models based on both 
norms of justice and the power of the bargainers. The 
models examined in this project included three models 
based on justice and one based on both justice and 
power- Previous studies have shown that models that 
ignore the investments of the bargainers are Inadequate) 
hence* models based solely on power were not examined.
Hodala l»«»d UL ■*««**£. ttOEAA
Th. thraa aodala baaad axcluslvoly on juatlca noraa 
Moroi (1) Eouitw Thaorv (Adana, 1943), (2) IhA EjJUl 
Surolua Mora (Koaorlta and Laung, 1985), and (3) Tha 
laraalnlna Thaorv (Koaorlta and Chartkoff, 1973).
Equity thaory pradlcta that sharaa in a coalition 
jhould bo dlractly proportional to tha lnputa aada by 
aach of tha aaabara.
'Tho aqual surplua nora la baaad on tha prlnclpla 
that aach bargainor ahould rocalva hla/har Input, and
Justico Norms
10
tho oxcoss profit should bo dlvidod oqually among tho 
bargainors. Tho oqual surplus norm can bo dofinod by 
Equation It
E » I  + <l/n)(V - 2  1 ) ,
IS 1 1
where E denotes the expected reward of playar i in 
IS
coalition St I denotes playar i's inputt and the 
suaaation is ovar n, tha nuaber of playars in 
coalition S.
Tho bargaining thaory predicts that axpictatlons 
will ba basad on splittlng-the-diffaranca batwaan tha 
aoulty and equality noras.
A Modal Band an lath J u it m  mad Ppwtr
XtU Enual Modal (Koaorita. 1979)
asauaas that the axpactations of tha bargainers will
change ovar rounds of bargaining. Initially* tha aodal
pradlcts that aach parson will attaapt to fora tha
coalition that aaxaizes initial axpactations* denoted
E * for indlvdual 1 in coalition S* as follows!
IS
E ■ v(S)/s* whara v(S) danotas tha value of S
IS
and s danotas tha nuabar of parsons in S. Tha basic 
assuaptlon of this aodal is illustrated in Equation 2t
r r-1 r-1
E - aax E ♦ (1/s) ( v(S) - 2, aax E 1*
IS IT IT
Justict Noras
11
r
where E denotes the expectation of aeaibcr 1 in
IS
r-1
coalition S on round rj aax E danotas tha aaxiaua
iT
expectation of aiaiabar i in altarnativa coalitions on 
tha pravious round; and tha suaaatlon is over s» tha 
number of members in coalition $. Successive iterations 
of Equation 2 yield predictions on subsequent rounds of 
bargaining•
To account for tha investments of bargainers in tha 
coalition-input paradigm* Komorita# Leung, and Barth 
(1964) proposed an extension of tha equal excess aodal 
that transforas tha original three-parson gaae into a 
nan gaae according to the following rulei
v(S)' ■ v(S) - I  I ,
S
where v(S) and v(S)' denote the values of coalition S in 
tha oriuinal and transforaed gone* respectively* I 
danotaa tha input of bargainor and tha suaaatlon la 
over tha aaabars of coalition S. Predictions are 
derlvad froa tha transforaad gaaa using tha equal excess 
nodal* than tha input* (lnvestaents) of the bargainors 
are added to those predicted shares yielding predictions
Justict Norms
12
ralativa to tha original gams.
Summary Riaul-ts aJL Coalition-input EtuullMM
Savaral studios havo usod this paradigm. Both 
inputs and quota valuas appaar to hava significant 
offsets on bargaining outcomas# but inputs ara much mora 
saliant than quota valuas (Komorita and Laung# 1985).
In ganaral# tha raaults support tha pradictions of tha 
Justict norms# and ara inconsistant with thaorias that 
lgnora tha inputs of tha bargainors. Tha raaults 
suggaat that no ona thaory is likaly to ba valid in all 
typas of gamas. Thus# it is important to datarmina tha 
ganarality of aach thaory.
Studios by Komorita and Laung (1985) and Komorita# 
Ellis# and Holton (1987) avaluatad tha accuracy of tha 
justlca norms and obtainad tha following rasultst first# 
tha justlca norms ara mora accurata whan thara is a high 
corraspondanca batwaan inputs and quota valuas. Sacond# 
aqulty thaory is mora accurata whan tha valua (profit) 
of tha partnarship is small ralatlva to tha sum of tha 
inputs# wharaas aqual surplus is mora accurata whan tha 
profit is largo. Third# tha justlca norms ara lass 
accurata whan tha varlanca of inputs is vary largo. 
Equity thaory is axtramaly inaccurate and sansitlva to 
high input varlanca.
Thasa rasults hava important implications for tha
Justice Norms
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generality of these theories. In particular* they 
indicate that equity theory is severely restricted in 
generality* and suggest that its long-range prospects as 
a universal theory of coalition bargaining are not very 
promising. Furthermore* since justice norms completely 
ignore the quota values of the bargainers* they cannot 
account for the effects of power (alternatives) in 
coalition formation. Any theory that Ignores either 
power or justice is unlikely to be accurate in a variety 
of situations (Komorita and Leung* 1965).
Other experiments using this paradigm have shown 
that bargainers sometimes accepted shares that were less 
than those they could have received in an alternative 
coalition (Komorita* Ellis* and Melton* 1987). It was 
suggested that norms of reward allocation may have been 
in conflict with another type of normi a norm of 
maximizing collective welfare. The latter norm 
prescribes that some members are expected to sacrifice 
individual gain in the interest of group welfare. In 
triads in which players A and B accepted shares (by 
forming ABC) that were less than thair joint outcome in 
AB* the norm of collective welfare may have dominated 
the equity norm. In other triads* the AB coalition may 
have formed because the norm of maximizing collective 
welfare may not have bean as salient. It was suggested 
that coalition formation is not based entirely on
Justice Norms
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maximizing payoffs* and othar motives* such as 
collactiva welfare* also play an Important rola 
(Komorita* Ellis, and Melton* 1987). This lmpllas that 
factors Ilka collactiva welfare should be takan Into 
account If a thaory of coalition formation Is to ba 
accurata In a varlaty of situations.
If tha norm of collactiva walfara has a significant 
affact on tha sallanca of justlca norms, than It Is 
plauslbla that randarlng collactiva walfara Irralavant 
may raduca tha sallanca of thaaa norms. This lmpllas 
that justlca norms ara lass llkaly to ba accurata In 
situations where collactiva walfara Is unimportant. 
Flgura 2 lllustratas a variation of tha coalitlon-lnput 
paradigm which alimlnatas tha incantiva to form ABC* 
hanca minimizing collactiva walfarai
Insart Flgura 2 about hara
Notiea that in this gama tha value of tha grand 
coalition vCABC) is sat to zaro. This gama Is callad a 
n.n.u..Mddltl*« aaao, a gaaa in which tha valua of tha 
AtC coalition is lata than tha valuta of tha othar 
coalitions. Tharo la evidence to suggest that tha 
sallanca of justina noras aay vary with tha ralativa 
also of tha ABC coalition (Koaorlta and Kravltx» 1*7*)> 
ao it la possible that aodals based on justlca would not
Justice Norms
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be v«ry accurate in a nonsuparadditivt game.
By satting ABC aqual to zero, ona of tha players is 
nacassarily axcludad from a coalition. This may 
haightan tha compatitiva motivation of tha bargainers* 
sinca an axcludad playar cannot aarn a profit. Hence* 
aach playar must "compete" by trying to convinca ona of 
tha two ramaining playars to join him or har in a 
coalition. Compatitiva motivation may also ba 
halghtanad by incraasing tha incantivas to maximiza 
profit. In past studies* subjects bargainad for small* 
almost trivial incantivas* a.g.* school supplias. If 
tha incantivas wara much higher* tha motivation to 
maximiza profit might dominate tha justice norms. It is 
plausible that tha justice norms are lass salient and 
accurate whan compatitiva motivation is enhanced.
SMCM.QMMM SLt Ult ELftSJflt S&MSbL
Tha present study was an attempt to extend tha 
generality of various theories of coalition formation by 
assessing their accuracy in tha nonsuperadditlve 
coalition-input paradigm. Tha theories examined 
includadt equity theory* aqual surplus* bargaining 
theory* and tha aqual excess modal.
For tha purposes of this study* and in order 
to simplify tha analyses* only tha round 0* 1* and 
asymptotic (round infinity) estimates of tha aqual
Justice Norms
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0 1
• xcess model* hereafter denoted EE * EE * end 
oo
EE » were contrasted. It cen be shown that the 
round 0 predictions of the equal excess model 
coincide with the predictions of the equal surplus 
model. At the asymptote' the predictions of the 
equal excess model converge to the quota values of 
the bargainers.
This study also examined the effects of competitive 
motivation on the salience of justice norms. It was 
hypothesised that justice norms would be less salient 
and accurate when competitive motivation is enhanced.
Two experimental manipulations were used to heighten 
competitive motivations 1) the incentives of the 
bargainers were increased and 2) the Inputs 
(investments) of the bargainers were retained by the 
experimenter even if they were excluded from a 
coalition•
Lastly# this study tested the effects of inputs on 
the justice norms in a nonsuperadditive game. It was 
hypothesized that the variance of the inputs (defined 
as the difference between the inputs of the high 
and low input players)' the i u a  of the inputs' 
and the ratio of the Inputs of player C to player A# 
hereafter denoted kmmx > would have significant effects 
on the accuracy of the justice norms.
Previous research has shown that the sum and the
Justice Norms
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variance of inputs had significant effects on the 
accuracy of the justice norms in a superadditive game 
(Komorita and Leung* 1985; Komorita* Ellis* and Melton* 
1987)* so it is reasonable to assume that they would 
also have significant effects in a nonsuperadditive 
game.
The effects of Rmax have not been studied in past 
research. Rmax is an index of the contributions of the 
low input player as a proportion of the contributions of 
the high input player. Hence* it is a measure of 
disparity between the inputs of these players. Although 
the variance of the inputs is also a measure of the 
disparity between the high and low input players* it 
indicates an absolute as opposed to a proportional 
difference between inputs. It was hypothesized that 
variance and Rmax capture separate properties of the 
inputs and would affect the accuracy of various theories 
in different ways.
flUUuul
Sub-1 acta
The subject* ware 94 salt undergraduate students 
enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Their 
participation in the experiment- partially fulfilled e 
requirement of the course.
Justica Norns
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DtSiflO
Tha thraa-parson quota 
usad in all conditions with
20 for playars A' B' and C,
playad thraa ganas with tha
coalitions.
Tha thraa ganas variad
bargainars and tha propartia
sunnar izad in Tabla 1.
game shown in Fi 
quota valuas of 
raspactivaly. E 
sana valuas of t
in tha inputs of 
s of thasa thraa
gurt 2 was
60* 60' and 
ach triad 
ha thraa
tha
ganas ara
Insart Tabla 1 about hara
It can ba saan that Ganas 1 and 2 hava idantical 
Rnax valuaS' Ganas 1 and 3 hava Idantical variancas of 
inputs' and Ganas 2 and 3 hava idantical suns of Inputs. 
Systanatic variation of aach of thasa factors nakas it 
posslbla to assass tha accuracy of aach thaory as a 
function of tha variancas' suns* and Rnax valuas of tha 
inputs.
Though a variaty of invastnant conbinations ara 
possibla# Gang 1 invastnants of 5' and 1 wara chosan 
for playars A» 1* and C» raspactivaly. Tha invastnants 
for Ganas 2 and 3 wars linaar transfornations of tha 
inputs in Gana 1» i.a.# tha inputs of Gana 2 wara thraa 
tinas thosa of Gana 1# and tha inputs of Gana 3 diffarad 
by an additiva constant (+10). Thasa distributions of 
inputs wara usad bacausa thay allowad aach gana to vary
Justice Nonas
19
from tha other two gamts in ona factor, whila ramaining 
idantical to ona of tha gamas in anothar factor. As a 
result, aach factor was controllad for, and tha affacts 
of tha diffarant propartias of tha inputs can ba 
indapandantly assassad. For axampla, if tha rasults
show that Gama 1 d iffars from Gamas 2 and 3, wa can
attribute tha affa ct to tha sum of inputs (saa Table 1).
However, if tha ra suits for Gama 3 differs d from Gamas 1
and 2, wa can attr ibuta tha affect to Rmax (saa Table
1 ).
Exp.rla.nt.l Qflflfllfclflfll
Two variablas wara manipulatadt tha investments and 
tha incantivas of tha bargainars. In tha manipulation 
of tha invastmants of tha bargainars, half of tha triads 
wara told that if thay wara axcludad from a coalition 
thalr Invastmants would ba raturnad to thorn) tha othar 
half wara told that if thay wara axcludad from a 
coalition thair lnvastmant would ba lost.
In tha manipulation of incantivas, half of tha 
triads wara told that thay would ba bargaining for small 
incantivas, a.g., school supplies worth up to #3) tha 
othar half wara told that thay would hava tha 
opportunity to win a #20 cash prize.
Each triad playad thraa gamas in a randomized 
order. Eight triads wara assigned to aach of four
Justice Noras
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experimental conditions.
In summary* the design was a 2X2X3 (Investment by 
Incentive by Games) with repeated measures on Games.
Two dependent variables were analyzed* the frequencies 
of the three coalitions and the square root of the mean 
of squared deviations (RMSE) between predicted and 
observed payoff shares.
Procedure
Subjects were scheduled in groups of three and were 
seated face-to-face around a large table. They were 
each given a stack of poker chips worth 100 points. 
Subjects were simultaneously presented with written and 
tape-recorded instructions which informed them that* (a) 
they were Investors considering a business partnership) 
(b) they would be asked to negotiate the division of a 
prize (profits from that partnership)) (c) there would 
be a number of bargaining transactions in which they 
would be asked to negotiate the division of a prize) and 
(d) they would be awarded prizes based upon how much 
profit they accumulated.
For ell triads the instructions were identical 
except for the awarding of the prize. Half of the 
triads received the instructions!
"At the end of the experiment your profit 
will be summed over all transactions to 
determine your total profit* end your 
and your total profit will be converted
Justice Norms
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to prizes (tha school supplias in tha 
othrr room). Each of you can aarn up to 
#3 worth of prizas dapanding on your 
total profit. Tha mora points you 
accumulate* tha graatar tha valua 
of your prizas."
Tha othar half racaivad tha following instructions!
"Thara will ba many groups parforming 
tha sama task. Your profit will ba 
summao ovar all transactions to 
datarmina your total profit. At 
tha and of tha semester* tha parson 
in aach position (A* B* or C) who 
accumulatas tha most total profit 
will ba awarded a <20 cash prize.
In othar words* you are not competing 
against aach other* but against 
aach parson who has bean or will 
ba in your postition throughout tha 
course of tha semester. Thus* it 
is to your advantage to maximize 
profit ovar all trials."
Prior to aach transaction* subjects ware presented 
with an information sheet indicating tha investments 
they ware required to make on that round. Tha 
axparimantar than collected tha investments from aach of 
tna players before the actual negotiations began, 
subjects were allowed to bargain freely with no time 
limits*
As an experimental manipulation* the procedures
concerning the Investments differed across subjects.
Half of the subjects were toldi
"If you are excluded from a coalition* 
then you will receive no profits* but 
your Investment will be returned to 
you. This means that you will lose 
your Investment only if you form a 
coalition (partnership)•”
Justice Norms
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The other half were tolds
"I* you are excluded from a coalition, 
then you will receive no profits and 
your investment will be losl. This 
means that you should consider ycur 
investments as "overhead costs'* and 
you lose them whether or not you 
form a coalition (partnership)."
Upon receiving the information sheets, subjects 
were asked to consider which of the three coalitions 
they would like to form and how they wanted to divide 
the profits of the coalition* Subjects were asked to 
indicate their preferred coalition and proposed division 
of profits on a "tentative offer form*. The 
experimenter collected the tentative offer forms and 
projected the proposals on the wall using an overhead 
projector. Subjects were asked to consider the various 
offers and to indicate which offers* if any* they wished 
to accept on an "offer response form” .
After receiving the offer response forms* the 
experimenter projected the responses on the wall. A 
coalition tentatively formed if both members of the 
coalition accepted the same proposal. Subjects were 
then given a free period to discuss their proposals out 
loud. Subjects were allowed to discuss their proposals 
whether or not a tentative coalition was formed. The 
discussion period continued until one of the subjects 
turned in an offer response form indicating which offer
Justice Noris
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ht would Ilka to accapt. If two paopla accaptad the 
sii« offtr than a coalition was formad and aach parson 
was glvan his "profit” raprasantad by pokar chips. If a 
parson was axcludad from a coalition, ha racaivad no 
profit and his invastmant was althar returned to hi* or 
ratalnad by tha axparimenter. If no coalition was 
formad, tha procadura of prasantlng proposals and 
conplatlng offar rasponsa forms was repeated. Subjacts 
wara allowad to modify thalr proposals In tha ansulng 
round, howavar thay wara not required to maka anothar 
Investment on aach subsaquant round of bargaining.
fijjMlta
Two dapandant variables wara analyzed* tha 
fraquancias of tha thraa coalitions (AR» AC, EC) forming 
In aach condition and in aach gams, and tha squara root 
nf tha moan of squarad deviations batwaan predictad and 
obsarvad sharas (RNSE) for aach thaory. Tha RHSE valuas 
indlcata tha accuracy of aach thaorys tha smallar tha 
RNSE» tha closar tha pradictad payoff shares wara to tha 
obsarvad payoff sharas. For tha frequency data, a 
Cochran Q tast and savaral chi-square tasts wara 
conductad to datarmlna whathar thara wara significant 
differences in tha fraquancias of tha thraa coalitions.
A 2X2X3 (Invastmants X Incantivas X Camas) ANOVA was 
parformad on tha RNSEs for aach thaory to tast tha
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effects of tho experimental manipulations. To tost for 
significant differences between theories* Friedman's 
ANQVA of ranks and Wilcoxon's signtd ranks tost wire 
porformod for each game soparatoly. Hany tosts wort 
performed in this study) consoquontly# to minimize Typo 
I error# alpha lovol was sot at *01.
F n a u m c v  flAti
Tablo 2 shows tho frequencies and moan sharos of 
tho throo coalitions in oach gaato and in oach 
oxporimontal condition. Tho last coluMn in Tablo 2 
shows tho moan sharos and tho froquoncios of oach 
coalition across tho four oxporimontal conditions.
Pairs of valuos in paronthosos donoto moan sharos of tho 
"stronger* and "weaker" mombors of oach pair# 
rospoctivoly (e.g.# in AB* A is stronger and B is 
woakor). It enn bo soon that tho AB coalition was most 
froquont in all games* although only marginally mors 
froquont in Gams 2.
Insort Tablo 2 about horo
All thoorios oxaminod in this study predict that 
tho AF coalition should form in oach game. As Tablo 2 
shows* this did not always occur* and tho frequency of 
tho AB coalition differed across games. To tost whether
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these differences were significant, a Cochran Q test was 
performed. The Cochran Q test provides a method for 
testing whether three or more matched sets of 
frequencies or proportions differ significantly among 
themselves. In this experiment, matching was based on 
the fact that each group played all three games. The 
Cochran test is particularly suitable when data i n  
nominal or represent dichotomized ordinal information. 
Hence, the frequency data were separated into two 
categories! AB or not AB (AC or B C ) . The Cochran Q test 
was found to be significants Q 3 11.14 ( £ <  ,01), 
indicating that the frequency of the AB coalition 
differed significantly across games.
To determine whether there were significant 
differences in the frequencies of each coalition within 
each game* three chi-square tests were conducted* under 
the null hypothesis that the three coalitions are 
equally likely. These tests were performed for each 
game separately* and the frequencies were pooled over 
experimental conditions. Only Game 3 was significant at 
the .01 level* %  (2) 3 10.94. Since Game 3 had the 
highest Rmax value among the three games* these results 
suggest that when Rmax was low* as in Games 1 and 2* 
there were no significant differences in the frequencies 
of the three coalitions. However* when Rmax was high* 
the AB coalition occurred most frequently and the BC
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coalition occured least frequently. This implies that 
Rmax affects the likelihood of the AB coalition more 
than either the sum or the variance of the inputs.
To test whether the frequencies of the coalitions 
differed across experimental conditions! the coalitions 
were separated into two catsgories (AB and not AB) and 
pooled over one of the experimental conditions 
(Investments or Incentives). This procedure was used to 
satisfy the chi-square assumption that the expected 
frequency in each cell must be at least five. By 
dichotomizing the dependent variable and pooling over 
one of the conditions* expected frequencies were greater 
than five in all cases. Six chi-square tests (2 sets of 
3 tests) were performed* one for each game. None of 
these tests was significant at the .01 level. These 
results indicate that the experimental manipulations had 
no significant effect on the likelihood of the AB 
coalition.
P.uxa tt M l*
To evaluate the payoff predictions of the theories! 
the square root of the mean of squared deviations 
between p . sdicted and observed shares (RMSE) was 
calculated for each triad.
labia 3 shews the mean ItMSfs for each theory across 
the three games and four experimental conditions. The
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last coluan la 3 shows tha aaan RMSEs in aach gaaa
for aach th ha last row in Tabla 3 shows tha aaan
RMSEs for aa )ry in tha four axpariaantal
conditions.
,er*- Tabla 3 about hara
Tha row naans of Tabla 3 show that aquity thaory 
oo
and EE pradictad poorly whan tha sua of inputs was 
saall (Gaaa 1) and whan input varianca was larga 
(Gaaa 2). Thay pradictad bast in tha high Raax gaaa 
(Gaaa 3). It can ba saan froa Tabla I that Gaaas 1 
and 2 had identical Raax values. This suggasts that 
Raax was tha critical factor affecting tha accuracy
Equal surplus and EE pradictad bast in Gaaas 2 
and 3> and worst in Gaaa I. Tabla 1 shows that Gaaa 1 
had tha saallest sua of inputs# indicating that tha sua 
of inputs affected tha accuracy of thasa theories.
Tha aaan RMSEs of bargaining thaory era saan
oo
of aquity thaory and EE
to ba siailar across gaaas. This indicatas that 
tha properties of tha inputs had no affect on 
tha accuracy of its predictions.
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Two sets of analyses were conducted on the RHSE 
values: 1) tests on the effects of experimental 
conditions (Games* Investments* Incentives) on the 
accuracy of each theory* and 2) tests on the difference 
in accuracy between the theories.
Efftcta fll Experimental CQnditlflfU
To assess the effects of experimental conditions* 
a 2X2X3 (Investments by Incentives by Games) ANOVA was 
performed on each theory separately with repeated 
measures on Games. These analyses yielded the following 
significant effects: 1) Games for equity theory* F(2*5A)
1
* u.33, equal surplus* F(2,5A) = 7.88* and EE * F(2*54) 
= 7.00 and 2) the interaction between Investment by
1
Incentive by Game for EE * F'2*5A) * A.42. No other 
significant effect was found at the .01 level.
The effect of Games on equity theory* equal surplus 
1
and EE was not surprising* since inputs have been found 
to affect bargaining outcomes in previous studies. The
1
reasons for the triple interaction for EE are not cleer* 
and no explanation is offered.
There was no significant effect of any independent 
oo
variable on EE This Indicates that the accuracy of 
its predictions did not differ signlficantly across
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axpar1mental conditions*
Cgn.triat BttMtJtn IlMtatlii
Thara was no significant main affact of tha 
axparimantal manipulations; hancs* in ordar to contrast 
tha thaorias in aach gama, tha RMSEs wara poolad ovar 
Invastmants and Incantivas* Sinca tha arror varianca of 
tha ANOVA is partly a function of tha covarianct of tha 
pradictad values# it would ba inappropriata to compara 
tha RMSE value* using ANOVA. Therefore# all tha RHSEs 
in aach gama wara converted to ranks and as a 
praliminary comparison of tha theories# Friedman’s ANOVA 
of ranks was parformad on aach gama saparataly. Tha 
rasults of thasa tasts ara shown in Tabla 4. Tha maan 
ranks indicata tha comparativa accuracy of tha thaorias 
in aach garnet tha smallar tha maan rank* tha mora 
accurata tha thaory.
Insart Tabla 4 about hara
Thasa tasts wara significant at tha .01 laval» and 
thay indicata that equity thaory was gansrally laast
oo
accurata* aspacially In Came 2. Equal surplus and EE
1
wara intarmadiata in accuracy* and EE and bargaining
thao narally most accurata
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The Friedman's ANOVA mss also performed on the mean 
of the RHSEs, again pooling over Investments and 
Incentives. The results of this test are shown in Table 
5.
Insert Table 5 about here
This test was significant at the .01 level, indicating 
that tha mean accuracy of the theories significantly 
differ in each game. Thus, further analyses were 
conducted to compare the predictions made by each 
theory.
To compare the relative accuracy of the theories, 
Wilcoxon's signed ranks test was performed on the RHSE 
values, separately for each pair of theories in each 
game. The results of of these tests are indicated by 
the letters in Table 6.
Insert Table 4 about here
It can be seen that the predictions of eeuity
theory significantly differed from those of
1 oo
bargaining theory and EE in all games, and that EE
and equal surplus did not significantly differ from
each other in any of the games.
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1
The predictions of bargaining theory and EE 
significantly differed only in Game 3. This indicates
1
that the when Rmax was high* EE was more accurate than 
bargaining theory* as suggested by the RNSEs of Table 
3.
Discussion
Previous studies focused on the salience and 
accuracy of justice norms in a superadditive game. The 
present study was an attempt to extend the generality of 
various theories of coalition formation by assessing 
their accuracy in a nonsuperadditive game. The results 
suggest further limitations on the generality of 
equity theory as well as the equal surplus norm* and 
they indicate that Rmax (the ratio of the investments of 
player C to player A) has significant effects on 
bargaining outcomes•
The following hypotheses were tested in this studyi 
1) Justice norms will te less salient and accurate when 
competitive motivation is enhanced and 2) three games 
varying in three properties of the Inputs will have 
significant effects on the accuracy of various theories.
Three Independent variables were manipulated! 
Investments* Incentives# and Games. The manipulations 
designed to enhance competitive motivation (Investments 
and Incentives) yielded no significant effects# but the
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independent variable Games significantly affected the 
accuracy of v a r i e s  theories. Therefore# the effect of 
Games will be discussed first.
The three games used in this experiment varied 
three properties of the inputs. These properties weret 
1) the sua of the inputs# 2) the variance of the inputs# 
and 35 the ratio of the inputs of players A and C# 
denoted Rmax. Rmax differs from the variance of the 
inputs because it is a measure of the ratio of player 
C's to player A*s input# while input variance is a 
measure of the difference between the inputs of player 
C and player A. In this study# the sum of inputs was 
smallest in Game 1# the variance of inputs was largest 
in Game 2# and Rmax was highest in Game 3. Systematic 
variation of these factors makes it possible to assess 
the accuracy of each theory as a function of the inputs.
When the sum of inputs was small# Table 3 shows 
that equity theory and the equal surplus norm predicted 
oo 1
poorly. EE end EE were intermediate in accuracy# 
while bargaining theory predicted best. However# 
bargaining theory wee not significantly better than 
1
EE .
To account for the lneccuracy of equity theory when 
the sum of Inputs was smell# it is possible that high 
input players were less likely to propose reward
distributions b.s.d on tho nor. b.c.us# thoy ««r«
fssrful of being excluded from « coalition. In this 
gam*» it can ba shown that aouity theory predicts 
extremely large differences in shares between the high 
a... low input players. Although bargainers might agree 
that the high input player should receive the most 
profit, they may be reluctant to allocate an extremely 
large share to anyone. As • result, high input players 
who proposed a division of profits based on equity may 
have been excluded from many of the coalitions in this 
gaaa.
Tha inaccuracy of tha equal surplus norm whan tha 
sun of inputs was saall is surprising# sinca pravious 
studias indicata that aqual surplus is WMLA accurata 
whan tha profit is larga ralativa to tha sua of tha 
inputs. It is possibla that waak bargainars wara lass 
likaly to daaand equality bacausa thay wara afraid of 
baing axcludad froa * coalition. Sinca tha investaents 
of tha playars ralativa to tha profits ara saall# avan a 
shara of profits lass than thosa prascrlbad by tha 
aquality nora aay saaa fair to aost bargainars. Hanes# 
a low input playar who dsaands too auch aay ba perceived 
by tha othar playars in tha gaaa as baing graady and an 
undasirabla partnar. In particular# if a waak playar 
dsaands too aueh# tha strongar playars aay ba lass
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likaly to raciprocata offers to hla bacausa his daaand
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appears unreasonable considering the size of his 
investment. This explanation suggests that if a weak 
player demands equality when the sum of inputs is small* 
he is likely to be excluded from a coalition.
The accuracy of bargaining theory suggests that 
when the sum of inputs was small* many bargainers were 
more likely to form a coalition with someone who 
proposed a compromise between equity and equality* as 
bargaining theory predicts.
When input variance was large (Game 2)* equity 
theory predicted poorly. Equal surplus was fairly 
accurate* and not significantly different from bargaining
1
theory. The predictions of bargaining theory and EE 
were best* and did not differ significantly.
The predictions of equity theory were poorest when 
input variance was large. This finding is consistent 
with previous research (Komorlta* Ellis* and Melton*
1987). The predictions of equity theory in this game 
were identical to its predictions in the game where the 
sum of inputs was small* so it prescribed extremely 
large differences in shares between the high and low 
input players in a coalition. Thus* the explanation 
offered for equity theory's Inaccuracy when the sum of 
Inputs was small is also a plausible explanation for why 
it was inaccurate when input variance was large.
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Previous studies indicate that equal surplus is 
tsore accurate when the input variance is large (Komorita 
and Leung* 1985). Table 4 shows that equal surplus was 
fairly accurate when input variance was large* and its 
predictions did not differ significantly from those of 
bargaining theory. This suggests that some coalitions 
in this game may have based reward distribution on the 
equality norm.
1
However* the predictions of EE are seen to be 
significantly better than those of equal surplus.
This indicates that* hil«» equality may have been 
used in some coalitions* it was not the dominant 
norm.
The results of this study showed that Rmax had 
a significant effect on both the accuracy of different 
theories and the likelihood of the AB coalition.
Equity theory and equal surplus were fairly accurate 
when Rmax was high (Game 3). The predictions of
1
bargaining theory and IE were most accurate* and 
significantly differed from each other. The accuracy 
aa
of IE did nat differ significantly from the other 
theoriea in the high Rmax game.
Equity theery made its best predictiens in the high 
Rmax game. m  this game* equity theory prescribed less
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extrema shir >eiween high and low input players than 
in either the game where the sum of inputs was small or 
tha game where input variance was large. As a result, 
bargainers who proposed reward distributions based on 
equity may not hrve been excluded from a coalition as 
often in the high Rmax game as they may have been in the 
other two games.
Paradoxically# equal surplus was considerably more 
accurate in the game where Rmax was high than it was in 
the game where the sum of inputs was small, even though 
it made identical predictions in each game. To explain 
this result, it is plausible that when the sum of inputs 
is large, as in the high Rmax game, the relative ratios 
of the players9 investments (measured by Rmax) become 
more salient. This suggests that a high input Player 
may have been more willing to form a coalition with a 
low input player who demanded equality because, as a 
proportion of the total profit, the low input player's 
investment was similar to his own. If the inputs of 
each player were large relative to the profits, demands 
based on the equality norm may not have apieared as 
unreasonable to bargainers as when the inputs were 
small•
1
When Rmax was high, EE was significantly more 
accurate than bargaining theory. This indicates that 
compromising between equity and equality may not
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have occurred as often in this gene as in the
1
other two games. Since EE considers both power 
and justice* this result also suggests that power 
(defined by alternatives) may become more salient 
when Rmax is high.
Partial support for this hypothesis is provided 
by the results of Table 6 which show that the
oo
predicts n« of EE did not significantly from those
oo
of the other theories. Since EE predicts the quota 
values of the bargainers* this indicates that many 
coalitions divided profits at or near the quota 
values in the high Rmax game.
Further support for the hypothesis that high Rmax 
increases the relevance of power is provided by the 
significantly greater frequency of the AB coalition when 
Rmax was high (see Table 2). None of the other 
properties of the inputs had an effect on the likelihood 
of AB. Since the variance of inputs was small in the 
high Rmax game* it is unlikely that bargainers would 
propose extreme differences in shares. When Rmax was 
high* it is probable that bargainers proposed very 
ilmiler distributions of shares because of the high 
ratios between the different players' investments. As a
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result* bargainers may have given less consideration to 
the investments each player made* and more consideration 
to the profits available in different coalitions. This 
explanation suggests that AB formed in the majority of 
cases because the motivation to maximize profit became 
the primary concern of bargainers. When Rmax is high* 
it is plausible that the two strongest players will 
form a coalition* unless one of them demands too much or 
the weakest player makes extreme concessions.
These conceptions of bargaining in a 
nonsuperadditive game were supported by the comparative 
accuracy of the various theories examined in this study. 
The predictions of equal surplus are the most
CIO
egalitarian* while those of equity theory and EE are 
least egalitarian. All of these theories were not very 
accurate across games* though the accuracy of equity 
theory within games varied as a function of the
1
properties of the inputs. Bargaining theory and EE 
predict shares midway between equity and equality.
Across games* these theories were most accurate* and 
they differed significantly from each other only when 
Rmax was high*
Regarding the Incentives and Investments 
manipulations* the results of this study did not yield 
any significant effects of these independent variables. 
It is possible that the manipulations were not powerful
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enough to affect bargaining strategies. Apparently, it 
«ada no difference to subjects whathar thay could win up 
to #3 worth of school supplies or the possibility of a 
#20 cash prize. It may be that the affects of the 
incentive Manipulations ware negligible because 
bargainers in the high incentive condition did not know 
how likely it was that they would win the cash prize.
In contrast, in the low incentive condition, bargainers 
knew they would receive school supplies.
S i n j J L A l  C o n c l u s i o n s
The findings of this study suggest limitations on 
the generality of equity theory and the equal surplus 
nor*. Furthermore, they indicate that bargaining in a 
nonsuperadditive game may Include considerations not 
present in a superadditive game. The greater 
possibility of exclusion may discourage strong 
bargainer* from demanding equity and weak bargainers 
from demanding equality* particularly when their 
investment is small. However, when Rmax (the ratio of 
their Inputs) is high, bargainers may be less likely to 
consider inputs, and more likely to consider the profit 
available to them in different coalitions.
Among the theories examined, bargaining theory and
1
EC were the most accurate. Bargaining theory assumes 
that the high input player will demand equity and the 
low input player equality. Accordingly, each player
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decides to base demands on a coaproaisa between tha two 
norms, and bargaining thaory pradicts that bargainers 
will split-the-difference batwaan aquity and equality. 
This aspact of bargaining thaory is particularly 
ralavant in a nonsuperadditive game whara it is 
important for bargainors to consider tha possibility of 
baing axcludad from a coalition if thay damand too much.
1
EE also makas predictions that ara somawhara 
batwaan aquity and equality. In addition* it accounts 
for tha powar of bargai tars* making it mora likaly to 
yiald accurata pradictions than tha justica norms whan 
tha salianca of powar is incraasad* as in Gama l with 
high Rmax.
From tha rasults of this stjdy* it appaars that tha 
possibility of axclusion makas bargainors mora likaly to 
compromisa. In tha real-world# whara tha invastmants of 
partias and tha outcomas of coalition formation ara 
considarably graatar than thosa simulatad in tha 
laboratory* axclusion from a coalition partnership can 
ba vary costly. Tharafora* it is unlikely that 
bargainors would risk being left out of a coalition by 
demanding an unreasonable share of tha profit. Nowavar* 
whan tha risk of axclusion is reduced# i.a.* whan tha 
profit is large# and if all tha ralavant partias ara 
likaly to ba included in a partnership# than weaker 
bargainers may ba mora willing to risk demanding larger
Justice Horns
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shares of the profit because they believe that the 
stronger bargainers are likely to make concessions.
For now, the question of whether competitive 
motivation reduces the salience of justice norms remains 
unanswered. In this study, the manipulations designed 
to enhance competitive motivation did not have 
significant effects because they did not sufficiently 
arouse the competitive motivation of the subjects. It 
is plausible that the possibility of exclusion is the 
primary motivation of bargainers in this type of game, 
regardless of the incentives offered for maximizing 
profit. Further research might focus on whether 
competitive motivation reduces the desire of stronger 
flayers to compromise in a superadditive game. Under 
these conditions, the motivation to maximize profit 
might be more prominent, and the three-person coalition 
would occur less frequently than the two-person 
coalition involving the stronger players. It is also 
possible that bargainers would be more likely to base 
demands on equity under these conditions. As a result, 
equity theory might be more accurate than the other 
justice norms.
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Eaatngti
•
Shapley's (1953) definition of a quota game 
also spacifiad that tha value of the grand coalition 
aust be equal to tha sun of tha quota values of tha 
players. However > tCalish (in Kuhn* 1953) extended 
Shapley's definition to the case of ■-quota flimtl $ 
defined as a gaae in which v(S) * w for all coalitions S 
with a members. Hance» my example of a quota game is a 
special case of Kalisch's m-quota game.
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Table 1
Inputs and tha Properties of tha Inputs for Each Gane
£ u i Inputs
Sun of 
Inputs
Variance 
of Inputs Rnax
1 i»t 5, I) 15 8 .11
2 (27, 15, 3) 45 24 .11
3 <1», 15, 11) 45 8 .57
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Table 2
StMmry Table of Frequencies (f) of the Three Coalitions (AB, AC, BC) and Mean Shares
Investment Lost Investment Retained Totals
Prize Cash Prize Cash
f (shares) f( shares) f(shares) f (shares) f( shares)
Game 1
AB 5 (58,42) 2 (55,45) 3 (56,44) 4 (61,39) 14 (58,42)
AC 1 (66,15) 5 (66,14) 1 (48,32) 2 (59,21) 9 (60.20)
BC 2 (43,17) 1 (50.10) 4 (42,18) 2 (40,20) 9 (44,16)
PtAMO 2
AB 5 (60,40) 1 (58,42) 4 (58,42) 2 (57,43) 12 (58,42)
AC 0 — 4 (57,23) 3 (57,23) 3 (62.18) 10 (58,22)
BC 3 (42,18) 3 (48,12) 1 (40,20) 3 (38,22) 10 (42,18)
Game 3
AB 4 (58.42) 6 (56.44) 5 (55,45) 4 (59,41) 19 (57,43)
AC 3 (51,29) 1 (55,25) 3 (59,21) 2 (65,15) 9 (57,23)
BC 1 (45,15) 1 (33.27) 0 --- 2 (38,22) 4 (39,21)
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Tahla 3
Naan RMSEs of Each Theory Across Gamas and Conditions
Eaultv ThAflHf
Invastmant Lost Invastmant Ratainad
Gama Prlza Cash Prlza Cash Moan
1 13.4 16.6 21.9 16.2 17.0
2 13.7 23.2 16.6 21.9 18.9
3 6.9 5.9 5.1 11.6 7.5
\ ■/•can 12.0 15.2 14.0 16.6
Eoual Surolua
fill!
1 12.0 22.0 10.3 11.6 14.0
2 6.7 11.7 •
III 5.6 7.5
3 9.1 S.2 9.0 12.1 8.9
Moan 9.3 13.0 8.3 9.9
lirai;Inina IiUUlL*
6»««
f
1 5.6 13. 3 4.2 4.9 7.0
2 4.6 9.2 5.5 6.7 6.5
s 7.8 3.5 6.1 10.3 6.9
Hi m 6.0 5.7 5.3 7.3
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fill!
1 
2 
3
Hoar*
9.8 
9.2
10.5
9.8
1 2 . * 
15.2 
8.8
iTTT
U . 3  
1 0 . 0  
7.7 
10.7
10.9
13.8
1 0 . 8  
1 1 . 8
11.9
12 . 0
9.5
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Tabla 4
Mosn Ranks of Thaorlas in Each Gaaa 
ANOVA of Ranks
froa Frladaan's
In »»eh 9aaa. data hava baan pool.d 
conditions) banco, each aaan is basad 
obsarvatlons.
ovar axparlaantal 
on thirty-two
Table 5
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Mean Ranks of Thaorias Pooled Over Genes fron 
Friadaan's ANOVA of Ranks2
Equity Equal Bargaining
Theory
00
EE Surplus
1
EE Theory
4.3 3*4 3.3 1.9 2.1
2
Data ware pooled over panes and experlaental conditions* 
hence, each aaan is based on thirty-two observations.
The Friadaan's test was significant at the . 0 1  level,
TL <«> « 50.23.
Table <
Justice Nones
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Results of Wilcoxon's Signed Ranks Test
Mean values of RMSEs over gases, pooled over experinental 
conditions. Entries with different letters differ
significantly at .01.
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Figure 1
Superadditive Game
A
v < A ) « v C B ) ■ v(C ) * 0* 
v(AB) ■ 100, v(AC) » 30, v(BC) » 40} 
v(ABC) * 150
Justic# Noras
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Flgura 2
Nonsuporadditivs Gaaa
v(A) * v(B) ■ v(C) « 0{ 
w(AB) « 100, v (AC) » 80, v(BC) ■ «0) 
v(ABC) • Q
Appendix A
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Predicted Payoff Sharps and Coalitions for Each Thaory
Equity Ihtorv
E-BUil Surplus
Gama
1
2
3
AB (52, 48) (44, 3 0 (32, 28)
AB (54, 44) (52, 28) (34, 24)
AB (52, 48) (44, 34) (32, 28)
Iiraainlnfl ihaon#
Gama
1
2
3
AB (58, 42) (58, 22) (41, 19)
AB (40, 40) (42, 18) (43, 17)
AB (54, 44) (47.5, 32.5) (32.5, 27
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Instructions for High Incentive Condition
In many situations* individuals must join forces 
and cooperate with one another in order to achieve a 
mutual goal. This process of uniting to reach a common 
goal is called coalition formation. This experiment is 
about coalition formation in he business world. As you 
know* businesses sometimes form a coalition to increase 
profits. In this experiment we would like you to assume 
that you are the president of a firm considering such a 
merger. You may join forces with one of the other firms 
and the joint profit available will depend on which 
firms are involved in the merger. Your task in the 
experiment is to maximize the profits you receiva in a 
coalition.
You will be asked to negotiate with the other 
persons in your group* Each person represents a 
business. Each business is designated by a letters G*
M, or M. The business you represent is shown on the 
card in front of you.
Your task is to negotiate with the other businesses 
to determine which partnership you wish to form 
as wall as what your share of the profits should be 
in that partnership. The profits to be divided vary 
for the different coalitions. For examples
Appendix B
Justice Horns
59
COALITIONS
6N GW MW GMW
100 80 #0 0
It can be seen that tha profits to ba dlvidad anong
tho pirtntrship ntnbcrs vary depending on tht 
partenrship, Thost belonging to a particular 
partnarship nust nagotiata to datarmina how tha profits 
should ba dlvidad. If a partnarhsip forns that doas not 
includa you# you will not aarn a profit.
Your goal is to naxinlze your sharo of tha profits 
without ragard to how wall tha othar parsons ara doing. 
Thara will ba nany groups parforning tha sans task.
Your profits will ba su«»sd ovar all transactions to 
datarnina your total profit. At tha and of tha 
senester# tha parson is aach position (G# H, or W> who 
accunulatas tha nost total profit will aach ba awarded a 
#20 cash prize. In othar words# you ara not coMpeting 
against aach othar# but against aach parson who has or 
will ba in your position throughout tha course of tha 
semester. Thus# it is to your advantage to naxlnlze 
your profit over all trials.
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Instructions for Low Incentive Condition
In many situations, individuals must Join forcts 
and cooparata with ona anothar in ordar to achiava a 
mutual goal* This procass of uniting to raach a common 
goal is callad coalition formation. This axparimant is 
about coalition formation in ha buslnass world. As you 
know, businassas somatimas form a coalition to incraasa 
profits. In this axparimant wa would lika you to assuma 
that you ara tha prasidant of a firm considaring such a 
margar. You may join forcas with ona of tha othar firms 
and tha joint profit availabla will dapand on which 
firms ara involvad in tha margar. Your task in tha 
axparimant is to maximize tha profits you racaiva in a 
coalition.
You will ba askad to nagotiata with tha othar 
parsons in your group. Each parson raprasants a 
buslnass. Each buslnass is dasignatad by a lattars 6,
N, or W. Tha buslnass you raprasant is shown on che 
card in front of you.
Your task is to nagotiata with tha othar businassas 
in ordar to datarmlna which partnership you wish 
to fort* as wall as what your share of tha profits 
should ba in that partnership. Tha profits to ba 
divided vary for tha diffarnant coalltons.
Appendix C
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Instructions for Low Incentive Condition
In many situations# individuals must join forcas 
and cooparata with ona anothar in ordar to achlava a 
mutual goal. This procass of uniting to raach a common 
goal is callad coalition formation. This axparimant is 
about coalition formation in ha businass world. As you 
know# businassas somatlmas form a coalition to incraasa 
profits. In this axparimant wa would Ilka you to assuma 
that you ara tha prasidant of a firm considaring such a 
margar. You may join forcas with ona of tha othar firms 
and tha joint profit available will depend on which 
firms ara involved in tha merger. Your task in tha 
axparimant is to maximize tha profits you receive in a 
coalition•
You will be asked to negotiate with tha othar 
parsons in your group. Each parson represents a 
business. Each businass is designated by a letters 6»
H» or W. Tha businass you represent is shown on tha 
card in front of you.
Your task is to negotiate with tha othar businassas 
in ordar to determine which partnership you wish 
to form as wall as what your share of tha profits 
should be in that partnership. Tha profits to be 
divided vary for tha differnent coalltons.
Apptndix C
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For sxamp.it!
COALITIONS
GN GW MW GMW
100 80 60 0
It can ba saan that tha profits to ba divided among 
the partnership members vary depending on the 
partenrship. Those belonging to a particular 
partnership must negotiate to determine how the profits 
should be divided. If a partnerhsip forms that does not 
Include you# you will not earn a profit.
Your goal is to maximize your share of the profits 
without regard to how well the other persons are doing. 
At the end of the experiment# your profits will be 
summed over all transactions to determine your total 
profit# and your total profit will ba converted to 
prizes (the school supplies in the other room). Each of 
you can earn up to #3 worth of prizes depending on your 
total profit. The more points you accumulate# the 
greater the value of your prizes.
Justice Horns
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Procedure for High Incentive Condition
In frtmt o' should bo a tontativo offor forn# 
an offor rosponso fora, and sono poker chips. Tho pokor 
chips will bo usod to nako your invostnonts. Tho bluo 
chips aro worth 10 points# rods oro 5# and whitos aro 1. 
You will oach start with 100 points worth of chips.
At tho boginning of oach trial I will hand you an 
infornatlon shoot that has tho invostnonts you oro 
roquirod to nako for oach particular round as wall as 
tho profits associated with oach coalition.
HAHO OUT XNFORHATION SHEETS
As you can soo# C nust invest __# H nust invest .
and W nust invest Before oach round of bargaining I 
will collect those invostnonts fron you. Notice also 
that tho CM coalition is worth 100# tho SW coalition is 
worth 60» and tho NM coalition is worth 40. The GHW 
coalition is worth 0 points.
Now tho tontativo offor stage begins. During the 
tontativo offor stage# oach person nust exanine tho 
possible coalitions and decide which coalition ho would 
like to forn and propose a division of profits for that 
coalition. Those offers are not binding# that is# you 
aro not roquirod to accept your own offer. To nako a 
tontativo offor you should use tho tontativo offer forn
Apptndix D
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in front of you.To use this form you must!
1. Write you identifying letter in the space marked 
f rom.
2. Decide on which coalition you would like to form 
and write its letter in th space marked coalition 
proposed.
3. In the space marked offer you should fill in 
the amount of points you would like each 
member of the coalition to recieve.
6. To make sure your offer sums to the proper 
total , add the numbers in your offer and 
enter the result in the space marked total.
5. When you are through, hand your tentative 
offer form to me.
HAVE THIN FILL OUT TENTATIVE OFFER F O R M  
After I receive all the offer forms I will display 
them on the overhead.
READ CT :ERf ON THE TRANSPARENCY 
At this point, the free discussion period will 
begin. The object of the free discussion period is to 
negotiate over the division of points. In order to put 
this time to good use, you should attempt to exchange as 
much information about the offers as possible. For 
example, you might explain your reasons for making the 
offer you proposed, learn the reasons the others made
Justice Nons
the offers they did, and try to convince others to 
accept your offer. You night also propose a coalition 
that is not proposed in the tentative offer forns.
During the free discussion period you should 
exanlne all offers and decide if you would like to 
accept any of them.
IES1N DISCUSSION. AFTER IT HAS 60NE ON FOR A 
WHILE, OR WHEN THEY ARE ABOUT TO REACH A6REENENT, BE6IN 
EXPLAINING THE OFFER RESPONSE STAGE.
The free discussion period ends when one person 
turns in an offer response forn. Look at the offer 
response forn in front of you. If you decide not to 
eccept any of the proposed offers, you should piece en X 
on the line "I reject all offers.” If e new coalition 
has been proposed during the discussion period that does 
not appear on the transparency, you should also reject 
all offers and then propose that coalition in the next 
round of bargaining. If you decide to accept en offer, 
you should place an X by the letter of the person asking 
that offer. You nay only accept one offer, however, if 
nore than one person proposes identical coalitions, then 
you nay accept either one or both of then.
E I T H E R  L E T  T H E  D I S C U S S I O N  C O N T I N U E  O k H A V E  T H E N  
F I L L  O U T  O F F E R  R E S P O N S E  F O R N S .  A F T E R  O F F E R  R E S P O N S E  
F O R N S  A R E  F I L L E D  O U T t
When I have received all of the response forns, I
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will display the responses on the wall. 00 THIS.
If all members of any proposed coalition have 
accepted the same division of profits* then that 
coalition will have formed. I will then give each 
person in that coalition their profits from the "bank* 
in the middle of the table, If you are excluded from a 
coalition* then you will receive no profits and your 
investment will be lost. This means that you should 
consider your investments as "overhead costs" and you 
lose it regardless of whether or not you enter into a 
partnership. If no coalition is agreed upon* then 
negotiations will go to a second round offers. In this 
case*you will each fill out another tentative offer form 
and go through the discussion period and offer respense 
stage again. You do not have to invest on every 
negotiation.
Are there any questions?
IF THERE ARE HO QUESTIONS* BEGIN REAL TRIALS
Justice Norms
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Procedure for Low Incentive Condition
In front of you should bo a tontativo offor form* 
an offor rosponso fora, and some pokor chips. Tho pokor 
chips will bo usod to make your investments. Tho bluo 
chips aro worth 10 points* rods aro 5* and whitos aro 1. 
You will oach start with 100 points worth of chips.
At tho booinning of oach trial I will hand you an 
information shoot that has tho investments you aro 
roquirod to mako for oach particular round as wall as 
tho profits associatod with oach coalition.
HAND OUT INFORMATION SHEETS
As you can see* 6 must invost __* M must invost __*
and W must Invost __. Baforo oach round of bargaining 1
will colloct thoso investments from you. Notico also 
that tho CM coalition is worth 1C6* tho ON coalition is 
worth 60* and tho MW coalition is worth 60. Tho CM* 
coalition is worth 0 points.
Now tho tontativo offor staoo boglns. During tho 
tontativo offor stago» oach parson must examine tho 
possiblo coalitions and docldo which coalition ho would 
liho to form and proposo a division of profits for that 
coalition. Thoso offors aro net binding* that is* you 
aro not roquirod to aooapt your own offer. To make a 
tontativo offor you should use tho tontativo offor form
Appendix E
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in front of you.To ust this font you Musts
1. Writ* you identifying letter in the space Marked 
f roM .
2. Decide on which coalition you would like to forM 
and write its letter in th space Marked coalition 
p r o p o s e d .
3. In the space Marked offer you should fill in 
the aMount of points you would like each 
MeMber of the coalition to receive.
4. To Make sure your offer sums to the preper 
total# add the nuMbers in yeur effer end 
enter the result in the space Mark e d  total.
5. When you are through# hand your tentative 
offer fore to m o .
HAVE THEM PILL OUT TENTATIVE OFFER FORMS 
After I receive all the offer fores I will display 
thee on the overhead.
READ OFFERS ON THE TRANSPARENCY 
At this point# the free discussion period will 
begin. The objeet of the free discussion period is to 
negotiate over the division of points. In order to put 
this ties to good use# you should atteapt to exchange as 
Much inforaation about the offers as possible. For 
exaaple# you Might explain your reasons for Making the 
effer you proposed# learn the reasons the others Made
«
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ths offsrs thsy did* and try to convinca othtrs to 
accapt your offar. You aight also proposa a coalition 
that is not proposad in tha tantativa offar foros.
During tha fraa discussion pariod you should 
axaaina all offars and dacida if you would Ilka to 
accapt any of thao.
BEGIN DISCUSSION. AFTER IT HAS GONE ON FOR A 
WHILE, OR WHEN THEY ARE ABOUT TO REACH AGREEMENT» BEGIN 
EXPLAINING THE OFFER RESPONSE STAGE.
Tha fraa discussion pariod ands whan ona parson 
turns in an offar rasponsa fora. Look at tha offar 
rasponsa fora in front of you. If you dacida not to 
accapt any of tha proposad offars* you should placa an X 
on tha lint "I rajact all offars." If a naw coalition 
has boon proposad during tha discussion pariod that doas 
not appasr on tha transparancy* you should also rajact 
all offars and th<tn proposa that coalition in tha naxt 
round of bargaining. If you dacida to accapt an offar* 
you should placa an X by tha lattar of tha parson poking 
that offar. You say only accapt ona offar. Howavar* if 
pora than ona parson proposas idantlcal coalitions* than 
you nay accapt althar ona or both of thop.
EITHER LET THE DISCUSSION CONTINUE PR HAVE THEN 
FILL OUT OFFER RESPONSE FORMS. AFTER OFFER RESPONSE 
FORMS ARE FILLED OUTi
Whan I hava racaivad all of tha rasponsa forps* I
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will display the responses on the wall. DO THIS.
** •••bars of any proposad coalition hava 
accaptad tha sane division of profits* than that 
coalition will hava forned. I will than give *jch 
parson in that coalition thair profits fron tht "bank" 
in tha middle of tha tabla. If you ara axcludad from a 
coalition* than you will racaiva no profits* but your 
investment will ba raturnad to you. This naans that you 
wiil loss your invastmant only if you form a coalition 
(partnership). if no coalition is agraad upon* than 
negotiations will go to a sacond round offars. In this 
cast* you will aach fill out anothar tantativa offar 
for* and go through the discussion period and offar 
rasponso stags again. You do not hava to Invast on 
ovary negotiation.
Are there any euestionsf
IF THERE ARE NO QUESTIONS* SEOIN REAL TRIALS
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Appendix F
Sample Information Sheet
Coalition Values GN * 100 GW » 80 MW « to GMW « 0 
Investments 6 _____  M _____  u
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Appendix G
Saiaplt Tentative Offer Form
Fro* _____________ _
Coalition proposed __ ________
Of far Q _____  h _____  w
Total of Offers __________
